Default local auth policy

[Daniel Stone]

Hi,

On Fri, Mar 20, 2009 at 04:36:22PM -0700, Eric Anholt wrote:
> On Tue, 2009-03-17 at 14:06 -0400, Adam Jackson wrote:
> > On Mon, 2009-03-16 at 12:52 -0700, Eric Anholt wrote:
> > > On Fri, 2009-03-13 at 13:46 -0400, Adam Jackson wrote:
> > > > Normally I'd just change the default here, but I think this might be a
> > > > significant enough difference in behaviour that you should have to ask
> > > > for it.  So.  New -localuser option?  Change the default?  Bad idea,
> > > > give up, take up farming?
> > > 
> > > It sounds sensible, the only thing I'm concerned about is whether with
> > > this new default I could sudo <X app> and still get success.
> > 
> > It's not particularly well specified, at least for
> > getsockopt(SO_PEERCRED).  The Linux implementation appears to give you
> > the effective UID, not real, so suid apps would fail.  I'm not sure what
> > the other OS's implement offhand.
> 
> And sudo would fail as well?  That's extremely uncool.  Unless the plan
> is to add +si:localuser:0 as well.

Yeah, good point.  sudo mangles both real and effective gid, so we don't
really have a useful way to tell, so I guess you could just allow root
per default.

Note that this still breaks when using sudo -H, which is arguably a very
sensible idea in the first place, unless you manually set $XAUTHORITY,
and it's not a regression from su -.  But blaming the sudo developers
for this breaking seems a little pedantic.

Cheers,
Daniel
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