xserver: Branch 'server-1.3-branch'

[Jeremy Huddleston]

 render/glyph.c |   14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

New commits:
commit f912b5ccd3bfb8f0fc0d142feb88871858c07fb0
Author: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu.herrb at laas.fr>
Date:   Sun Jun 8 11:13:47 2008 -0600

    CVE-2008-2360 - RENDER Extension heap buffer overflow
    
    An integer overflow may occur in the computation of the size of the
    glyph to be allocated by the AllocateGlyph() function which will cause
    less memory to be allocated than expected, leading to later heap
    overflow.
    
    On systems where the X  SIGSEGV handler includes a stack trace, more
    malloc()-type functions are called, which may lead to other
    exploitable issues.
    (cherry picked from commit b1a4a96885bf191d5f4afcfb2b41a88631b8412b)

diff --git a/render/glyph.c b/render/glyph.c
index 6d09a0e..2ca02f0 100644
--- a/render/glyph.c
+++ b/render/glyph.c
@@ -42,6 +42,12 @@
 #include "picturestr.h"
 #include "glyphstr.h"
 
+#if HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#elif !defined(UINT32_MAX)
+#define UINT32_MAX 0xffffffffU
+#endif
+
 /*
  * From Knuth -- a good choice for hash/rehash values is p, p-2 where
  * p and p-2 are both prime.  These tables are sized to have an extra 10%
@@ -626,8 +632,12 @@ AllocateGlyph (xGlyphInfo *gi, int fdepth)
     int		     size;
     GlyphPtr	     glyph;
     int		     i;
-
-    size = gi->height * PixmapBytePad (gi->width, glyphDepths[fdepth]);
+    size_t	     padded_width;
+    
+    padded_width = PixmapBytePad (gi->width, glyphDepths[fdepth]);
+    if (gi->height && padded_width > (UINT32_MAX - sizeof(GlyphRec))/gi->height)
+	return 0;
+    size = gi->height * padded_width;
     glyph = (GlyphPtr) xalloc (size + sizeof (GlyphRec));
     if (!glyph)
 	return 0;